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IEstimating Vote-Speciﬁc Preferences from Roll-Call
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Benjamin E. Lauderdale, London School of Economics
Tom S. Clark, Emory UniversityIdeal point estimation in political science usually aims to reduce a matrix of votes to a small number of preference
dimensions. We argue that taking a nonparametric perspective can yield measures that are more useful for some
subsequent analyses. We propose a conditional autoregressive preference measurement model, which we use to gen-
erate case-speciﬁc preference estimates for US Supreme Court justices from 1946 to 2005. We show that the varying
relative legal positions taken by justices across areas of law condition the opinion assignment strategy of the chief
justice and the decisions of all justices as to whether to join the majority opinion. Unlike previous analyses that have
made similar claims, using case-speciﬁc preference estimates enables us to hold constant the justices involved, pro-
viding stronger evidence that justices are strategically responsive to each others’ relative positions on a case-by-case
basis rather than simply their identities or average relative preferences.deal point estimation in political science usually seeks to
reduce a matrix of voting data to a small number of pref-
erence dimensions. This process can be motivated through
a theoretical model of spatial voting, but it can also be moti-
vated as a simple exercise in data reduction. The resulting
estimates of individual preferences have facilitated a wide
range of subsequent analysis because they translate the original
voting data into a form that is comparable and amenable to
including in a regression model. There is no question that
having one or two numbers to summarize the behavior of a
political actor, relative to others, has many attractive features
for subsequent analysis. However, it also makes certain kinds
of analysis difﬁcult.
When used to test theories of bargaining in legislatures
or courts, such measures require one to rely on weakly iden-
tiﬁed temporal variation (Ho and Quinn 2010) or prevent one
from holding the composition of the legislature or court con-
stant. Without holding the set of voters constant, it is impos-
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of the patterns that are observed. Going from individual votes
to summary measures has the consequence of eliminating
from the data all within-individual variation. In this article,
we develop the idea that vote-speciﬁc measures enables us to
look at within-individual variation in behavior across dif-
ferent kinds of votes, where legislators or judges’ allies may
be different, even as the set of individuals remains the same.
If we want to make an argument that the patterns we observe
are due to strategic interactions, where actors look at what
other actors want in the given instance and respond accord-
ingly, identiﬁcation is greatly improved if we can exploit var-
iation in relative preferences of the same individuals across
different decisions.
However, this is not merely an argument about statis-
tical identiﬁcation. The application of the approach we de-
velop in this article is to the US Supreme Court. Theories
of judicial coalition building and opinion writing in a single
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1154 / Estimating Vote-Speciﬁc Preferences from Roll-Call Data Benjamin E. Lauderdale and Tom S. Clarktheir average preferences across all cases. If the justices do
systematically vary in their relative alignment across areas
of the law, the outcomes of these bargaining games should
vary as a function of these alignments as well. This concern
with preference variation by substantive issue is not about
measuring modest ﬂuctuations around more important gen-
eral patterns but rather more precisely identifying the impli-
cations of theories with minimum confounding.
To estimate these case-speciﬁc preferences, we develop a
model where judges’ preferences on each new case are ex-
pected to be equal to their preferences in preceding cases that
are cited in the new case, weighted by the relevance of those
cases as measured by the relative number of citations found
in the opinions. This model of judges’ preferences as following
their views about precedent cases is both legally plausible and
mathematically tractable, yielding a conditional autoregres-
sive (CAR) model speciﬁcation like those commonly used in
spatial statistics (Besag 1974). The underlying idea is broadly
relevant to decision making in common law courts systems,
where new cases are explicitly decided in the context of prec-
edent cases. However, because of the connection to CAR
models, it is also applicable more broadly to preference esti-
mation problems where it is possible to produce a suitable
metric of the similarity among votes based on metadata about
the subject of the votes. This model has the effect of smoothing
voting patterns across substantively similar cases to estimate
relative preferences in individual cases, and there are various
ways to deﬁne and measure substantive similarity in different
domains. The resulting estimates of relative positions have
signiﬁcant uncertainty at the case level; however, they none-
theless achieve the goal of enabling more credible identiﬁca-
tion strategies because they measure within-justice variation
in preferences that can be used tomake within-justice compar-
isons that have been previously unidentiﬁable.
How does this approach differ from previous approaches
to ideal point estimation, in particular the Supreme Court
ideal points estimated by Martin and Quinn (2002)? Most
fundamentally, it differs in that it is a case-level measure
rather than a year-level measure. Our approach does not
aim to reduce or simplify the roll-call data but rather to
transform it using auxiliary data into a form where it can be
used in case-level analyses. These case-level measures can
be used to generate yearly summaries of judges’ average
preferences similar to Martin-Quinn scores; however, they
also enable analyses at the case level that are impossible in
the absence of within-year, within-judge variation in mea-
sured preferences.
To demonstrate how such estimates can be used as the
starting point for subsequent analysis, we revisit a central
question in the literature on the Supreme Court: how muchThis content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms inﬂuence do individual members of the court exert over the
majority opinion? In particular, we consider the assignment
of opinion authorship to a member of the majority coali-
tion and the decisions of all the justices in that coalition on
whether to join the decision. We ﬁnd evidence that chief
justices strategically assign authorship to associate justices
in cases where the associate justice’s preferences are more
proximate to the chief and to the median, within the set of
cases where the chief and a given associate justice are both
in the majority. The relative weight on proximity to the
chief and to the median varies by chief justice, suggesting
that different chief justices have followed different assign-
ment strategies. We also ﬁnd some evidence that justices
who are in the majority are less likely to join the majority
opinion in areas of law where their preferences are further
from the author, holding constant the identity of the au-
thor, the joining justice, and the full set of justices serving
on the court. Because these results are true holding justices
ﬁxed, as preferences vary by area of law, we interpret this as
evidence that the author’s preferences inﬂuence the content
of the opinion, and that chief justices are strategically re-
sponsive to this fact in making assignment decisions.
AUTOREGRESSIVE SPATIAL PREFERENCE
ESTIMATION
Our estimation approach diverges from previous Bayesian
ideal point estimators in several respects. We do not ex-
plicitly motivate our model using a random utility model
that describes a choice between binary policy alternatives
under spatial preferences (Poole 2005), although we explain
the mathematical relationship between our model and stan-
dard ideal pointmodels in the appendix, available online. For
our purposes it is enough to assume that our voters ( justices)
have latent preferences for each side of each case relative to one
another, and that these are correlated across cases. To this end,
we do not aim to estimate a small (Jackman 2001) or even a
large (Lauderdale and Clark 2014) number of dimensions to
summarize behavior: we aim to estimate latent preferences on
every vote. That is, we want to know which justices were close
to the cutpoint in a case, and in what order of preferences they
were likely to have been arranged. To learn this, instead of
modeling the latent preferences on each vote in terms of a
small number of latent dimensions, we estimate them condi-
tionally on each other, subject to an assumption that latent
preferences are more similar on substantively similar cases
than on substantively distant cases. From a more mechanical
perspective, we aim to smooth the binary observations of
justice votes into continuous measures of justice preferences,
with the smoothing occurring across substantively similar
cases..035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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based on the logic of common law: the views of a judge
about how to decide a case will reﬂect their views in similar
past cases. There will be novel features of the immediate
case, and so there will not be a deterministic relationship,
but past decisions will nonetheless be indicative to the ex-
tent that they are legally relevant. There are several possible
sources of data on this relevance; here we focus on the use
of citation data to identify legally relevant precedents for
each new case (Clark and Lauderdale 2012; Lauderdale and
Clark 2012). The relative number of citations to each past
Supreme Court case indicates the likely strength of the
correlation between the latent preferences of a judge in the
new case to each of those precedents. A judge’s preferences
in a particular past case that is cited very heavily are going
to be much more predictive of their preferences in the new
case than are their preferences in a substantively irrelevant
case that is not cited at all.
The model, as we show next, could be estimated using
any plausible metric of legal similarity. In some applica-
tions, different metrics may be more or less theoretically
sound, depending on the types of inferences one wants to
draw. We opt for the citation metric for a number of rea-
sons. First, the universe of citations that are relevant is a
function of forces largely outside of the court’s decision-
making processes. The “die is cast,” so to speak, when the
lower appellate court resolves questions of law, and the Su-
preme Court subsequently selects those questions for reso-
lution. Second, as opposed to proprietary sources, such as
Westlaw KeyNotes, we are able to collect data from every
opinion—including those concurring or dissenting—within
each case the court resolves.1 This mitigates against the pos-
sibility that the majority opinion strategically avoids a relevant
precedent or issue, as concurring or dissenting opinions have
an incentive to undermine any such decision—if consequen-
tial—by citing the strategically avoided precedent.
The ﬁnal reason we prefer the citation-based measure of
similarity is because the Supreme Court’s practice is to de-
cide only a single (or, maybe, two) legal question from po-
tentially complex cases. If we were to use, for example, lower
court citation patterns, we might systematically underesti-
mate the similarity of two cases from different jurisdictions,1. Professionals services, such as Westlaw and LexisNexis, code the
legal issues considered in majority opinions and create coding schemes
that can be used to measure the legal similarity of any pair of cases. We
have estimated our model using the number of Westlaw KeyNotes com-
mon to each pair of majority opinions instead of the citation overlap. The
estimates from that model are substantively identical to what we ﬁnd in
this analysis. Using the citation data, though, has the beneﬁt of not relying
on proprietary data and being therefore fully transparent and replicable.
This content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms because they will rely on precedents from their own courts
(e.g., California courts will cite California courts, Third Circuit
courts will cite courts from the Third Circuit) that are never
cited in the other courts because they have their own prec-
edents on those very legal questions. By the same logic, we
risk overestimating the legal similarity of substantively di-
verse cases that happen to come from the same jurisdiction.
Thus, while there are plausible alternative metrics of sub-
stantive adjacency, we believe that the citation patterns data
are sufﬁciently exogenous to the court’s decision-making pro-
cess, our data collection method mitigates against strategic
inﬂuences on citations, and the data are properly tailored to
measuring similarity.
We describe a generative model for judges’ latent case-
speciﬁc preferences using the following logic. We assume
that the latent preferences of justice i∈ f1, 2, :::, ng for case
j ∈ f1, 2, :::,mg have an expected value equal to the citation
count weighted mean of her preferences in all previous cases,
with a normally distributed variance around that expected
value of 1/lw. We deﬁne cjj0 as the fraction of the citations
appearing in case j to all precedent cases that are to the
speciﬁc precedent case j0 (i.e.,oj0cjj0 p 1).
wij ∼ N (mij, l21w ),
mij p o
j21
j0p1
cjj0wij:
These latent preferences wij are mapped into observable
votes for judges according to the following speciﬁcation. Let
Y be an n# m matrix of votes, where yij p 1 if justice i is
in the majority in case j, yijp 0 if justice i is in the minority
in case j, and is missing otherwise. Let wij be the latent
preferences for justice i on case j, let aj be the cutpoint for
case j, and let bj ∈ f21, 1g be the polarity of case j. The
observed decision is
yij p 1 if
wij ≥ aj and bj p 1
wij ≤ aj and bj p 21

yij p 0 if
wij ! aj and bj p 1
wij 1 aj and bj p 21

That is, we assume there exists a threshold value for each
case that divides the justices into voting coalitions depend-
ing on whether their each justice’s latent utility is greater
or lesser than that threshold. The b parameter captures the
polarity of the case majority—if a case majority is voting in
a “liberal” direction, then having latent preferences greater
than the case location (aj) implies that a justice did not vote
with the majority; when the majority is voting in a “conser-
vative” direction, the opposite relationship will exist. Hence,.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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a liberal outcome will be associated with bp 2 1.
It is important to note here that our model does not
require that justices vote sincerely when deciding cases.
There may be incentives for justices to strategically endorse
a majority outcome in order to try to exert inﬂuence over
the content of the opinion (Cameron and Kornhauser 2013;
Epstein and Knight 1998). Our model only relies on the
logic of a cutpoint model of voting. Thus, as long as any stra-
tegic incentive operates monotonically in the latent space our
model will recover the correct ordering of the justices. If, for
example, there is a sincere majority of the left ﬁve justices in a
case, strategic voting with that sincere majority by one of the
four remaining judges is only problematic if that judge is not
the left-most of those judges. Strategic voting only poses a
challenge to this model if the incentive to vote strategically is
nonmonotonically associated with the justices’ preferences
over the case outcome.
The preceding speciﬁcation of the generative model for
the latent votes wij is mathematically equivalent to a par-
ticular speciﬁcation of a conditional autoregressive (CAR;
Besag 1974) prior for the covariance of a justice’s prefer-
ences across cases. Most often CAR models are used in geo-
graphic contexts, where a physical adjacency matrix A deter-
mines the covariance structure. The following formulation is
based on the notation and Gibbs sampler described by Besag
et al. (1995). To describe our model as a CAR prior, we deﬁne
ajj0 ≡ cjj0 1 cj0j. That is, the strength of adjacency between two
cases is the fraction of citations in case j that are to case j0, plus
the fraction of citations in case j0 that are to case j. The reason
for this is that while we model the generative process for new
case preferences purely in terms of past rather than future
cases, when making inferences on the basis of such a model
the future cases are informative about the past cases as well as
vice versa. Thus, the Amatrix is symmetric, with ajj ≡ 0. Then
the CARmodel speciﬁcation for the relationship of a justice’s
latent preferences across cases is the following:
p(wijj⋅)∝ lm=2w exp
n
2
1
2
lwo
j
o
j0
ajj0(wij 2 wij0)
2
o
: ð1Þ
This conditionally normal distribution implies that the
justices’ latent preferences in each case (wij) are, in expec-
tation, a weighted average of their latent preferences across
all other cases (wij0 ), weighted by the strength of the rela-
tionship to each other case (ajj0).
This “intrinsic conditional autoregressive” prior is not a
proper multivariate normal distribution: the prior only iden-
tiﬁes the latent preferences relative to one another and the
mean of the wij is therefore not identiﬁed (Besag et al. 1995).
Intuitively, if each element of wij has an expected value that isThis content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a precision-weighted mean of the other elements wij0 (where
j0 ≠ j), then the overall mean ojwij must be unidentiﬁed as
the same relative positions can be achieved around any over-
all mean. Thus, to identify the scale, we put independent stan-
dard normal priors over the case locations/cutpoints aj—
that is, aj ∼ N (0, 1). By assuming the case cutpoints fall in
a range dictated by a standard normal prior, we guarantee
that the justices’ case-speciﬁc latent preferences wij will lie in
a similar range. We also standardize the aj at each iteration
of the MCMC sampling procedure (see the appendix), with
proportionate rescaling of all other parameters.
Cases decided unanimously tell us nothing about relative
preferences: the cutpoint aj is either greater than or less
than all of the voting justices’ latent preferences. We still in-
clude these cases as they are part of the adjacency network
and can indirectly strengthen the estimation of the correlation
structure of preferences across areas of the law, even though
we cannot determine whether a case is unanimous because
the cutpoint was to the left or to the right of all the justices.
This indeterminacy has implications for the design of the
MCMC sampling procedure described in the appendix.
To summarize, the inferential problem we are trying to
solve is to estimate continuous latent preferences on cases
when we only observe binary votes. Our solution is to infer
those continuous preferences by looking to justices’ behav-
ior (binary votes) on related cases. We assume that the jus-
tices’ preferences in any given case are generated as a nor-
mal draw with mean equal to a weighted average of their
latent preferences in legally related precedent cases, withweights
determined by relative frequency of citations to those cases. The
observed votes result from whether the latent preferences of a
justice are above or below a cutpoint that is speciﬁc to that case,
and whether the case has a left majority or a right majority is
estimated from the data at the same time.We specify aMCMC
simulation of the posterior distribution for model in the ap-
pendix, where we also provide details on chain length, con-
vergence and other implementation details for the results re-
ported below.Quantities of interest and interpretation
The model generates several quantities of interest. First, the
posterior distributions of the wij provide our beliefs about
the relative positions of justices on a given case. These allow
us to construct probabilistic estimates of which justices were
likely to have been pivotal in a given case, and they can also
be compared to the estimate of the cutpoint aj for that case,
in order to yield a visual representation of preferences in that
case. Second, we can deﬁne the conditionally expected de-
cision of each justice as mij poj0ajj0wij0 . This weighted av-.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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justice’s position on a given case, conditional on all his or her
other decisions. Compared across justices, this is a useful
summary of how the justices are aligned at a given “location”
in the law, as opposed to a given case. Third, we can deﬁne a
justice’s mean preferences vi p ojwij
 
=m, which capture
the justice’s average position and are functionally very similar
to unidimensional ideal point estimates of judicial preferences.
Traditional scaling models in political science project a
complex high-dimensional space onto a low dimensional
space (Jackman 2001; Martin and Quinn 2002; Poole and
Rosenthal 1985). As noted earlier, the utility of such scaling
is to summarize a great deal of information in a way that
captures the systematic patterns underlying the information.
Implicitly these models are also models for case/vote-speciﬁc
preferences, and those preferences can be derived from the
estimates of the model as they depend linearly on the esti-
mated preference dimensions and case/vote parameters. Our
approach directly estimates these case-speciﬁc preferences,
dispensing with the intermediate step of constructing a small
number of general preference dimensions. This enables more
ﬂexible estimation of the case-speciﬁc preferences that are
implicated by the bargaining theories that we wish to test.
With our approach, one might object that the preference
space onto which we project the data is just as complex as
the original data: what does this model achieve? One response
to this objection is to observe that the data we summarize are
not just N justice votes for each ofm cases but also anm bym
matrix of legal similarity among all pairs of cases, so some data
reduction is occurring. However, the better response is to
simply acknowledge that our estimates are better thought of
as a transformation of the dispositional voting data than as a
reduction of that data. Data reduction occurs later through
the applications that the transformation enables. Binary ju-
dicial votes plus citation counts jointly contain information
about justices’ expressed preferences regarding case disposi-
tion and how those preferences vary across areas of the law,
but they do not contain this information in an immediately
accessible way. To be useful for theory testing, these raw data
sources must be transformed, and this is the role of the model
we describe above. These model-based transformations of the
raw data are useful for secondary analyses of judicial behavior,
in particular for empirically testing theories about the pro-
cesses of bargaining over opinion assignment and content.
ESTIMATES
In ﬁgure 1 we show local linear regressions of the case-
speciﬁc preferences wij for each individual justice over their
career. In contrast to the dynamic preference estimates
of Martin and Quinn (2002), our method estimates muchThis content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms more limited changes in judicial preferences in this period.
The reason for this difference is that our model is not ex-
plicitly dynamic: the default expectation of our model (be-
fore observing the votes of justices in a new case) is that
justices’ preferences stay the same over time. The model for
each justice’s preferences in a new case is a weighted aver-
age of that justice’s preferences in past, relevant cases, plus
normally distributed variation around that expectation. None-
theless, we do recover shifts in preferences for several jus-
tices widely believed to have shifted over their time on the
court (Black, White, Blackmun, Souter), because their votes
unambiguously indicate that they have moved relative to
their colleagues. In contrast, the Martin-Quinn scores as-
sume a constant distribution of case parameters over time,
which sometimes implies large parallel, convergent, or diver-
gent shifts in the preferences of all the justices in the latent
space.
Median justices
Past research on the US Supreme Court has shown that
there is variation in who serves as the critical median justice
(e.g., Lauderdale and Clark 2012, 2014) Our approach here
allows us to estimate, similarly, who is the median justice
in any given case, with the additional beneﬁt of being able
to characterize the signiﬁcant uncertainty intrinsic to such
estimates. We compute the probability of any justice being
the median or pivotal justice in every case that the justice
heard by identifying the median justice at each iteration of
the MCMC simulation for every case, and then computing
a mean across iterations to compute the posterior proba-
bilities of being in this pivotal position, for each justice in
each case. In ﬁgure 2, we average these estimates by term,
generating estimates of the fraction of cases in each term
for which each justice was the pivotal justice.
As Lauderdale and Clark (2012) show, the relative degree
to which the role of median is concentrated on particular
justices varies over time. During the 1970s, the pivotal role
was held disproportionately by Justices Stewart, White, Black-
mun, and Powell. By contrast, throughout the late-1990s and
early-2000s, the pivotal role was shared disproportionately
by two justices—O’Connor and Kennedy. However, the cen-
tral lesson we can draw from ﬁgure 2 is that no single jus-
tice is ever pivotal in all, or even most, of the cases heard
by the court. Compared to common public perceptions of a
court dominated by a small number of pivotal justices, these
estimates reveal that the variation in the rate at which jus-
tices are pivotal is not nearly as unequal as some presume.
In terms of the average rate over their careers, the least fre-
quently pivotal justice in the data set is Douglas, the most
frequently pivotal is White, but they only differ by about a.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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to have been pivotal.
In some sense this should not be a surprise. We observe
dispositional voting coalitions that cannot be rationalized
by a constant unidimensional ordering of justices, and these
occur in a substantial number of cases. This indicates that
there must be substantial case-to-case variation in the rel-
ative preferences of justices, and that the pivotal justices in
such cases may be individuals who one thinks of as inhabit-This content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ing the extremes of the court more generally. Put differently,
knowing who is pivotal depends on knowing something about
the substantive nature of what the court is deciding.
Figure 2 also demonstrates a second pattern. The prob-
ability of being pivotal is not something that often shifts
sharply and dramatically. Rather, we often see a justice’s piv-
otality waxing or waning over the course of his or her ca-
reer. Justice White, for example, became increasingly pivotal
during the late-1960s and early-1970s. Justice Blackmun, ini-Figure 1. Local linear regression (normal Kernel, Bandwidth 2 years) estimates of the mean position of each Supreme Court justice over time (top). Local
linear regression (normal kernel, bandwidth 2 years) of Martin-Quinn scores for each Supreme Court justice over time (bottom)..035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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his career. Occasionally, though, we see sharp shifts involving
many justices. In a short period of time during the late-1960s
and early-1970s, Justices Black, Warren, Harlan, and Fortas
left the court, while Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist
joined the court. This had the consequence of making Justices
Marshall and Brennanmuch less frequently pivotal, as justices
who were often to their left were replaced by justices who were
rarely to their left. However, the relatively smooth pattern of
transitions, accompanied by an even smoother evolution in the
issues and questions the court addresses, leads to a picture of
the inﬂuence of individual justices that is gradually evolving
and that does not change sharply in response to single justice
replacements.Case-speciﬁc preferences
Figure 3 shows the relative positions of the justices voting
on four high-proﬁle cases. These plots show preferences rel-This content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ative to the cutpoint, so they slightly overstate the uncertainty
of justices’ positions relative to one another. The top two cases
show Roe v.Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The align-
ments of justices within the voting coalitions in these cases
are roughly as wewould expect them to be. In the 7–2 decision
in Roe, the justice most tenuously in the majority is Burger,
who rarely voted for the pro-choice side of subsequent abor-
tion cases. While the majority opinion author Blackmun was
fourth from the left, near the middle of the court in Roe, our
estimates in Casey place him farthest to the pro-choice end
of any justice. Blackmun’s concurrence/dissent in the com-
plicated disposition of Casey was notably apocalyptic in ref-
erence to the four justices who voted to strike down Roe,
reinforcing the idea that Blackmun was likely furthest of any
justice on the left of Casey from voting the other way.
In Miranda, we see the expected result that the more
ardent civil libertarians Brennan and Douglas were to the
left of the remaining justices in the majority: Black, Fortas,
and Warren. Black, while typically on the left of the courtFigure 2. Estimated fraction of cases in which each justice was the pivotal justice, for each term.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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ticularly so in criminal justice cases. Kyllo, the ﬁnal panel, is
an interesting case because it involves the unusual alliances
of justices discussed at the beginning of this article. It also is
a good case for demonstrating the fact that our model is not
always conﬁdent of the polarity of the decision. Unlike the
other cases plotted in ﬁgure 3, in Kyllo the 95% intervals of
some justices cover the estimated cutpoint. This happens
because our model estimates the probability that the ma-This content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms jority is on the left (i.e., bjp 21) to be 68%, in contrast to
estimates of very nearly 0% or 100% for the other cases
shown in the ﬁgure. Substantively, the expansive deﬁnition
of what constitutes a 4th Amendment search is usually con-
sidered to be a left position, and so placing Thomas and
Scalia to the left of Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Rehn-
quist is probably the correct alignment, as opposed to placing
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer to their right. However, given
only the voting and citation data, there is some remainingFigure 3. Estimated latent ideal points for justices in selected cases.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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justices is unusual.
As we can see from these plots, our estimates of justices’
relative locations are not precise for any particular case but
do reﬂect meaningful variation in justices’ relative prefer-
ences across different areas of the law. Our ability to pin
down the relative locations of justices varies by case, as a
function of the number of total citations from that case to
other cases. For example, Roe is a case connected to many
other cases, with a large number of subsequent cases elab-
orating the court’s doctrine on abortion rights and related
issues, often with varying cutpoints as the case facts varied.
As a result, we can infer a great deal about the relative po-
sitions of the various justices on this case. In contrast, for a
case like Kyllo, there are fewer related cases with more het-
erogeneous rulings, and so our uncertainty about the relative
positions of justices is greater.APPLICATION: STRATEGIC DYNAMICS IN OPINION
ASSIGNMENT AND WRITING
The US Supreme Court makes decisions on many impor-
tant policy questions, deciding by a simple majority who
wins or loses a dispute arising under the law. Critically,
though, the court does much more than decide which lit-
igant wins or loses (the disposition)—the court is primarily
responsible for developing principles of law that control all
future cases posing similar legal questions. Those principles
of law are not the outcome of a simple vote but instead a
complex process of opinion writing and bargaining among
those justices in the dispositional majority. It is for this
reason that scholars of the Supreme Court have devoted
considerable attention to understanding the politics and
process of opinion writing and negotiation among the jus-
tices. In particular, the process of selecting an author for the
court’s majority opinion and the decision by individual jus-
tices to “join” a majority opinion have been the subject of
considerable interest (e.g., Brenner 1982; Epstein and Knight
1998; Lax and Cameron 2007; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahl-
beck 2000; Murphy 1964).
When the Supreme Court decides a case, the chief jus-
tice, if he is in the majority, has the power to select the
majority opinion writer. If the chief is not in the majority,
the most senior member of the majority has the power.
Next, the majority opinion writer drafts an opinion and has
an incentive to attain the assent of at least four other jus-
tices, because only an opinion signed by a majority of jus-
tices has the weight of binding precedent. These two stages
of Supreme Court decision making have given rise to sev-
eral theoretical questions. Can a chief justice strategicallyThis content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms shape the nondispositional outcome of cases with his power
to assign majority opinions? Who controls the content of
the opinion, given the complexities of unstructured bargain-
ing among a group of justices?Modeling opinion assignment
Opinion assignment on the Supreme Court is one of the
longest-studied phenomena in the literature on judicial
behavior (e.g., Brenner and Spaeth 1988; Lax and Cameron
2007; Maltzman et al. 2000; Murphy 1964; Rohde and Spaeth
1976; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Ulmer 1970). Among other
ﬁndings and claims, scholars have argued that the opinion
assigner, usually the chief justice, has an incentive to as-
sign opinions to his ideological allies and experts in the
particular area of the law at hand, and that the importance
of a given case can condition those incentives. These stud-
ies almost always rely on simple, parsimonious measures
of judicial preferences to measure ideological alignment
among the justices—such as issue-speciﬁc agreement rates
(Maltzman et al. 2000) or Martin and Quinn (2002) esti-
mates of latent ideology (Carrubba et al. 2012). These ap-
proaches, while grounded in validated measures of judicial
preferences, limit the ability to statistically identify variation
in ideological alignment among justices. The former method
only allows for variation in agreement between pairs of jus-
tices across the 12 substantive areas of the law studied. As
a consequence, justices cannot vary in their agreement over
time or in substantively more nuanced ways. The latter ap-
proach only allows for variation in alignment between jus-
tices over time, precluding differential alignment across sub-
stantive questions presented in cases.
The traditional approach of treating justices’ relative
preferences as stable across areas of the law provides a great
deal of analytic leverage and has the great beneﬁt of parsi-
mony (see, e.g., themyriad applications ofMartin andQuinn
2002). However, in recent years, scholars have increasingly
asked how judges’ preferences might vary across legal dimen-
sions and questions (e.g., Bailey and Maltzman 2011; Korn-
hauser 1992; Lauderdale and Clark 2012, 2014; Lax 2007).
These observations have particular import in the context of
opinion assignment and writing, because there exists a strong
norm on the US Supreme Court that opinions be assigned in
equal numbers across the justices, though deviations have
been observed (e.g., Benesh, Sheehan, and Spaeth 1999; Maltz-
man and Wahlbeck 1996a). As a consequence, if chief jus-
tices work to ensure equity in opinion assignments, varying
ideological alignments from case to casemay present a strategy
opportunity for the chief justice to inﬂuence opinion writing
and content. The chief justice can distribute cases to justices.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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proximate in a speciﬁc case, reducing his average distance to
the author across all cases while maintaining the norm of equal
assignment.
A class of formal and informal models of opinion-
writing predicts that who writes the opinion could matter
greatly for the content of the opinion (Bonneau et al. 2007;
Lax and Cameron 2007; Maltzman et al. 2000). We refer to
these models of bargaining and opinion assignment as “au-
thor inﬂuence models” and contrast them with “monopoly
models,” which predict that opinion authorship does not
matter. The key distinction between these two classes of
models is that the former predicts a set of strategic incentives
for opinion assignment, whereas the latter predicts no stra-
tegic incentives concerning opinion assignment.
The empirical literature has examined opinion assign-
ment, in part to help adjudicate among these competing
models of bargaining. Some of this evidence suggests that
the power to assign the majority opinion is used strategi-
cally to inﬂuence case outcomes (Lax and Rader 2015; Maltz-
man et al. 2000). One of the most powerful research designs
in the literature leverages “vote ﬂuidity” to evaluate strategic
opinion assignment. Vote ﬂuidity refers to the idea that jus-
tices who are “marginal,” in the sense that they are ideologi-
cally proximate to the minority coalition, have the potential
to “defect” and switch their votes from the majority coalition
to the minority coalition. Past empirical studies have argued
that justices who are closest to being on the fence between
the two coalitions are assigned the majority opinion at a dis-
proportionately high rate (Brenner 1982; Brenner and Spaeth
1988). Lax and Rader (2015) push this research design fur-
ther by connecting it to four speciﬁc models of opinion writ-
ing: two monopoly models and two author inﬂuence models.
They ﬁnd evidence consistent with the claim that the chief
justice uses opinion assignment to strategically maintain co-
alitions and induce opinions that are aligned with his prefer-
ences.
However, it has also been widely documented that there
exists a norm by which opinion assignments are distributed
evenly among the justices (e.g., Brenner and Palmer 1988;
Maltzman and Wahlbeck 1996b; Maltzman et al. 2000). As-
suming this norm is binding, if the justices’ relative pref-
erences do not vary from case to case, then it is not possible
for the chief justice to assign cases disproportionately to his
ideological allies, though he might assign disproportionately
important cases to them. But if relative preferences vary case
to case, then the chief justice could use that variation to stra-
tegically assign cases to justices when they are most aligned
with him, relaxing the constraint imposed by the norm of
balanced workloads. Relying on measures of preferences thatThis content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms do not allow for case-to-case variation in preferences has
prevented previous analyses from comparing two competing
accounts of strategic opinion assignment. According to the
voteﬂuidity logic, the chief justice assigns opinions tomarginal
justices in order to hold coalitions together. According to au-
thor inﬂuence models, the chief justice has an incentive to
assign opinions to justices that share his views on a given case,
particularly when they do not do so more generally.
Because we estimate case-by-case preferences, we can ex-
ploit potentially consequential variation in which justices are
closest to the Chief, or to other key positions in the distri-
bution of justices, across different areas of law. To this end,
we specify an empirical model in which opinion assignment
is estimated as a function of either a justice’s ideological
distance to the chief justice or ideological distance to the
case-speciﬁc voting threshold (the point of indifference be-
tween the two coalitions). An alternative possible opera-
tionalization of the vote ﬂuidity model is that distance to the
median, rather than the coalition division, is what really
matters. Thus, we also consider each justice’s distance to the
court median. Finally, we consider each justice’s distance to
the coalition median, which, though not predicted by the
median of the majority coalition model, potentially captures
the inﬂuence of the center of the majority coalition. In order
to test these varying predictions about authorship assign-
ment, we construct case-speciﬁc measures of the median
justice, the ideal point of the majority coalition median, the
voting cutpoint, and the chief justice. We then calculate the
absolute distance for each justice to each of these points, for
each case.
We specify a hierarchical conditional logit model, which
we customize for these data. We limit our attention to the
cases where the chief justice is in the majority and is there-
fore assigning the author of the opinion. The general form
of the model using all four distance measures described
above is as follows; however we also ﬁt the model using one
distance measure at a time by ﬁxing other coefﬁcients to
zero. Let Yij p 1 if justice i is in the majority in case j.
Where Sij ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether justice j was the au-
thor in case i, we ﬁt a conditional logit model as a function
of the position of that justice relative to the four positions.
X1ij is the distance from justice i to the cutpoint in case j;
X2ij is the distance to the median of the court; X3ij is the
distance to the median of the majority coalition; X4ij is the
distance to the chief justice.
Each of these distance measures Xkij is estimated with un-
certainty, and so we do not plug the mean posterior mea-
sure of each distance ~Xkij directly into the model. Instead,
we model each measured mean posterior distance as dis-
tributed normally around the (unknown) true value of that.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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dard deviation (error) of the posterior estimate (qkij):
~Xkij ∼ N (Xkij,q2kij), ð2Þ
where t ∈ f1, 2, :::, 27g is the natural court for case j, and
r ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4 is the chief justice for case j, our model has
the following form:
Sij p g
court
it 1 o
4
kp1
dcourtkt Xkij    if    Yij p 1, ð3Þ
Sij p 2∞   if    Yij ≠, ð4Þ
p(Sij p 1)p
exp(Sij)
onip1exp(Sij)
: ð5Þ
Notice that we assume in our speciﬁcation that if a justice
is not on the court or not in the majority, her probability of
authoring is zero (Sij p 2∞). Among those who are on the
court and in the majority (including the chief justice), the
probability of authoring is generated by a conditional logistic
model where the latent utility of authorship for each justice is
based on a justice by natural court speciﬁc intercept git, plus
the effects of the distance measures k, which depend on
natural court speciﬁc coefﬁcients dkt. We generally expect the
dkt to be zero or negative for most of the distance measures we
consider, as the theories of authorship assignment we con-
sider yield predictions where authorship probability declines
as a justice’s position gets further from the cutpoint, the court
median, the majority median and/or the chief justice.
The slope and intercepts from this model are indexed by
the natural court; however we specify the model as a hi-
erarchical model, in which natural courts are nested within
chief justice regimes. Such a speciﬁcation allows us to make
statements about the average relationships among all courts,
among natural courts during a particular chief justice’s tenure,
and so forth. Thus, we include the following parameters and
prior distribution assumptions in ourmodel:gcourtit ∼ N (gchiefir ,
j2
gchief
), gchiefir ∼ N (gi, j2g), dcourtkt ∼ N (dchiefkr , j2dchief ), d
chief
kr ∼
N (dk, j2d), and j2g, j2d , j2gchief , j2dchief ∼ E(1).
The hierarchical model for g and d reﬂects the fact that
baseline authorship probabilities for a given justice will de-
pend on the other justices on the court, and particularly on
the chief justice. For example, if we set bktp 0, we would be
assuming that the relative positions of justices on a given
case versus other cases do not matter, but the git would still
allow for the possibility that some justices are more likely to
author than others, given that they are both in the majority.
These natural court-speciﬁc intercepts mean that the com-
position of the court as well as the average distance to a
given chief justice is accounted for in the baseline probabil-
ity of each justice authoring an opinion, conditional on be-This content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ing in the majority. As a result, any effects associated with
the distance measures must come from within natural court
variation across areas of law.
We program and simulate these models in JAGS (Plum-
mer 2008) via R (R Development Core Team 2008), with
reported results based on two parallel chains of 4,000 itera-
tions, thinned by 2, recorded after a burn-in of 1,000 iterations.
We summarize the core ﬁndings in ﬁgure 4, which shows the
posterior estimates of the dkt coefﬁcients for each natural court
(posterior means and central 95% credible intervals). The top
row of results shows slope estimates for four distinct (uni-
variate) models in which we include only a single distance
measure as a covariate, reﬂecting the distinct theoretical
predictions from each model. The bottom row shows dkt es-
timates from a (multivariate) model that nests all the distance
measures together in a single empirical speciﬁcation assuming
additive effects on the logit scale.
These results suggest that there are real and signiﬁcant
differences between the assignment strategies followed by
different chief justices. When estimated in separate models,
distance to the court median and to the chief justice are
negatively associated with being assigned to author by the
chief justice, both when used alone to predict assignment
and in the model including all predictors. These ﬁndings
are consistent with a class of theoretical models (both formal
and informal) in which the chief justice simultaneously tries
to assign opinions to individuals who share his policy views
while also maintaining the stability of the majority coalition
(e.g., Lax and Cameron 2007). The results for the majority
median and cutpoint distances are weaker and less consis-
tent between the univariate and multivariate models.
With respect to differences across the chief justices, there
is evidence that Chief Justice Warren’s assignment strategies
were more inﬂuenced by distance to the court median than
to his own position. This is suggestive of a more consensual
model of assignment under Warren than under the later
chief justices, one that aimed primarily to use authorship to
consolidate the majority by ensuring that the author was
close to the median of the court. In contrast, Chief Justice
Burger’s assignments are predicted most strongly by dis-
tance to his own position, strikingly more so than either
Warren or Rehnquist. This is consistent with Burger’s rep-
utation as being particularly strategic in his authorship as-
signment decisions, with an aim to maximize his own in-
ﬂuence on opinions (e.g., Woodward and Amstrong 1979).
One particularly notable example arose in the context of Roe
v. Wade, where the justices feuded at length over Burger’s
attempt to assign the opinion despite disagreeing with the
disposition, resulting in a circulated, though not published,
opinion by Douglas accusing the chief justice of acting.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Fi
gu
re
4.
C
o
ef
ﬁ
ci
en
ts
of
hi
er
ar
ch
ic
al
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
lo
gi
t
m
od
el
fo
r
au
th
o
rs
h
ip
,
fo
r
ea
ch
na
tu
ra
l
co
ur
t
in
ch
ro
no
lo
gi
ca
l
or
d
er
,
w
it
h
ce
n
tr
al
95
%
p
os
te
ri
or
in
te
rv
al
s.
Th
e
to
p
ro
w
sh
ow
s
es
ti
m
at
es
fr
o
m
fo
u
r
m
o
d
el
s
in
cl
u
d
in
g
on
ly
th
e
si
n
gl
e
d
is
ta
n
ce
as
a
p
re
d
ic
to
r.
Th
e
b
ot
to
m
ro
w
sh
ow
s
es
ti
m
at
es
fr
o
m
fo
u
r
m
o
d
el
s
in
cl
ud
in
g
ea
ch
of
th
e
d
is
ta
nc
es
to
ge
th
er
.
This content downloaded from 128.041.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 78 Number 4 October 2016 / 1165inappropriately (Schwartz 1988, chap. 4). Rehnquist appears
to be somewhere in between Warren and Burger in terms of
assignment strategy, with both proximity to the court me-
dian and to his own position weakly predicting assignment.
This evidence points to an insight that could only be re-
covered by contemplating case-speciﬁc preferences. Due to
an empirical focus on static (Segal and Cover 1989) pref-
erences, or preferences that can only vary term by term (Mar-
tin and Quinn 2002), scholars have missed a potential impli-
cation of the norm of proportionate assignment of opinions
among the justices. Rather than simply being required to assign
opinions to all justices and therefore strategically selecting
“marginal” justices when there is a risk that a coalition will fall
apart, it may instead be that the chief justice follows the norm
of proportionate assignment by leveraging case-by-case varia-
tion to assign opinions to justices when they are more closely
aligned either to the chief ’s own position (Burger) or to the
median of the court (Warren). Chief Justice Burger, and to a
lesser extent Rehnquist, was able to utilize variation in which
justices most strongly share his views to help sustain a pat-
tern of relatively equal assignment across cases.
Modeling the decision to join an opinion
Part of the motivation behind the studies seeking to un-
derstand the choice of opinion author is an interest in the
inﬂuence individual members of the court have over the
content of the Supreme Court’s opinions. Various theories
and empirical tests have appeared in the literature (for a re-
view, see Clark and Lauderdale 2010). The key issue at hand
concerns how the court’s institutional arrangements shape
the way in which the collective views of up to nine justices
will be aggregated into a single statement of law in the form
of the court’s opinion. Among the many competing theories
are claims that the median justice will control the court’s
opinion (this argument is a direct application of Black 1948).
Bonneau et al. (2007) argue that if the Supreme Court were
to operate as a closed-rule institution, then the logic of Romer
and Rosenthal (1978) would apply, and the opinion author
would have some degree of control over the opinion. Other
arguments are more oriented around the court’s actual insti-
tutional rules and constraints and make arguments about
author inﬂuence (e.g., Lax and Cameron 2007) or the differ-
ence in bargaining leverage between members of the majority
coalition and members of the minority coalition (Cameron
and Kornhauser 2013; Carrubba et al. 2012). Related argu-
ments contend that justices likely to “switch” sides and are
therefore more marginal members of the majority coalition
have special inﬂuence (e.g., Lax and Rader 2015).
These (sometimes) competing theories yield a set of pre-
dictions for which our estimates provide new empirical le-This content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms verage. Justices who are more proximate to the opinion
should be more likely to join the opinion. Therefore, we can
evaluate whether the distance from a justice to any theo-
retically predicted point is predictive of her decision to join
the majority opinion. From the existing literature, we iden-
tify ﬁve such points: (1) the cutpoint dividing justices into
voting coalitions (more marginal justices have inﬂuence);
(2) the court median; (3) the chief justice (assignment power);
(4) the majority coalition median; and (5) the opinion author.
We model the decision to join a majority opinion by
each member i in the majority voting coalition of case j. Let
Oij p 1 if justice i joins the majority opinion in case j and
Oij p 0 if she does not join the majority opinion. We
specify the decision as a function of each justice’s distance
to each of the theoretically implicated points in the voting
space. As in the model for authorship, we explicitly in-
corporate the measurement error associated with the esti-
mated distance measures, as described in the previous sec-
tion. For this model, we also add in dummy variables Zlj for
the total number of judges l in the majority coalition on the
decision in case j, to capture the fact that the incentives
to join change with the number of justices in the majority,
not just their relative positions. Coefﬁcients for each of these
variables are estimated for each natural court, hierarchi-
cally modeled within chief justices, hierarchically modeled
within the entire period.
Oij p g
court
iat 1 o
5
kp1
dcourtkt Xkij 1 o
9
lp1
nltZlj, ð6Þ
p(Oij p 1)p
exp(Oij)
11 exp(Oij)
: ð7Þ
In the model for authorship, the slope and intercepts
from this model were indexed by the natural courts, which
we estimated as nested within chief justice regimes. Here we
use a similar nested structure for the slope coefﬁcients dcourtkt
and the coefﬁcients on the dummy variables for coalition
size nlt. However, we use a different nested structure for the
intercepts, reﬂecting the goal of holding constant the joining
justice, the authoring justice, and the overall composition of
the court (natural court). We estimate separate intercept for
each combination of these three, with the variation in these
across natural courts varying around mean joining justice by
authoring justice effects. Simulation details are also as in the
previous application. The estimates for the coefﬁcients on
each of the ﬁve distance variables are reported by natural
court in ﬁgure 5. As before, we report in the top row models
that include only each of the distance measures individually
and in the bottom row slope estimates from an empirical
model that nests the theories into a single speciﬁcation..035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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Volume 78 Number 4 October 2016 / 1167Starting with the left column of ﬁgure 5 and moving
through the columns in order, we ﬁnd a clear positive as-
sociation between distance to the cutpoint and joining the
majority opinion in both the univariate and multivariate
models. In the second column, we see an weak relationship
between distance to the median justice and joining the
majority opinion. In the third column, we see inconsistent
and generally weak relationships with the distance from the
median of the majority coalition. In the model that includes
all ﬁve distance measures, though, the effect is consistently
larger during the Warren and Burger courts. In the fourth
column, there is similarly weak and inconsistent evidence
that distance to the chief justice predicts joining behavior.
Finally, in the ﬁfth column is a negative association be-
tween joining the majority opinion and distance from the
opinion author, which has grown stronger over time. This
is a much stronger relationship in the multivariate model
than the univariate model, a model in which there are posi-
tive associations between joining and distance to the cutpoint.
Why do we ﬁnd a consistently strong negative associa-
tion with distance to the author in the joint model at the
same time that we also ﬁnd positive associations with dis-
tance to the cutpoint? Recall that our model assumes a cut-
point voting decision in which any strategic incentives to vote
against one’s sincere preference operate spatially. If any
justice, for example, to the right of the cutpoint is strate-
gically induced to vote as if he were to the left of the cut-
point, then all justices to that justice’s left are also so in-
duced. The justices nearest the cutpoint in any given case
are the most likely justices to be insincerely supporting
the majority side of the case. This would tend to reduce their
probability of joining the majority opinion, particularly
when authorship is awarded to an extreme judge within the
majority. When the situation is reversed, the extreme judge
in a majority coalition with a moderate author has a much
weaker incentive to not join the opinion, as their disposi-
tional vote is always sincere.
All of these relationships reﬂect variation as a function
of case-speciﬁc estimated position, holding ﬁxed the joining
justice, the authoring justice, and the natural court. The major
implication of these results is that distance to the opinion
author is the most powerful predictor of the decision to join a
majority opinion, and this has become more true over time, at
least since the end of the Warren court. Connecting these re-
sults back to those in the previous application and recognizing
that the chief justice can only select the author, not the ma-
jority coalition, there is a strong suggestion that a strategic
chief justice can use his assignment power to select opinion
authors who share his own views in any given case, and this
has consequences for the content of the opinions that areThis content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ultimately written. Taken together, these two analyses sug-
gest a strategic dynamic by which the chief justice knows
that, given a particular majority coalition, the opinion author
can inﬂuence the opinion content and therefore strategically
selects different opinion authors as they vary from case to
case.
Threats to inference
As with all studies of the history of the Supreme Court, the
data we examine are observational, and it is necessary to be
cautious in the interpretation we draw from the associa-
tions we ﬁnd. The ﬁrst stage of our analysis, generating case-
speciﬁc preference estimates using dispositional voting and
citation data, is fundamentally descriptive rather than causal.
We understand our measures of preference as estimates of
the relative positions of justices on a case, based on their
behavior in legally similar cases. Where our analysis does
implicate causal questions is when wemove to the analysis of
models relating these preference measures to opinion as-
signment and joining behavior.
We have argued that the association between distance to
the chief justice and opinion authorship, holding ﬁxed court
composition and the identity of the Chief, suggests strategic
assignment on the part of the Chief. This could also reﬂect
strategic and successful lobbying for assignment by the as-
sociate justices, or some spurious association between the
issue areas that particular justices specialize in authoring
opinions within, and the preferences of those justices and the
Chief. Since our identiﬁcation strategy utilizes relative pref-
erence variation of justices across areas of law, we cannot
effectively control for areas of law in the models for assign-
ment and joining behavior.
Another set of alternative explanations for our results
arise to the extent that the measure of legal adjacency that
we use (i.e., citation) is endogenous to whether particular jus-
tices voted together, although we do not believe this is a major
concern given the inferences that we draw. For it tomatter that
the speciﬁc cases cited are chosen after these outcomes that we
consider, it would need to be the case that opinion authors
catered to the chief justice or median justice by preferentially
citing the past cases where they agreed with those justices on
the disposition but did so in different ways under different
chief justices.
To yield a similar spurious ﬁnding in our analysis of
joins, the author would have to do this selectively for only
the other justices in the majority who ultimately join the
opinion. We also note again that our data include the total
number of citations appearing in an entire set of opinions
for a given case—including citations from majority, con-
curring, and dissenting opinions. If there exists a serious.035.151 on January 21, 2019 06:15:55 AM
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1168 / Estimating Vote-Speciﬁc Preferences from Roll-Call Data Benjamin E. Lauderdale and Tom S. Clarkconcern that a precedent that is legally relevant is being
downplayed by the majority, for example, then some other
justice will have an incentive to note that in a separate opinion.
What we cannot overcome, though, is the possibility that all
potential legal questions or concerns raised by the litigants or
participating justices are completely co-opted by the majority
in a way not reﬂected in the pattern of citations in the case.
While we cannot entirely rule out these possibilities, we can
note that our results replicated using Westlaw Key Numbers
rather than citations to generate measures of legal similarity,
which are not produced directly by the judges. However, be-
cause those data are proprietary and not available publicly, we
opt to rely on the publicly available citation data for the anal-
yses here.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we have described an approach to estimating
case-speciﬁc (or vote-speciﬁc) preferences, using roll-call
data in combination with data describing the substantive
similarity of cases to one another. Our approach is a de-
parture from most scaling methods in one fundamental re-
spect: traditional scaling methods aim to simplify the patterns
in the data as much as possible. This is attractive if the goal is
parsimony, but leaves little variation left to be examined in
subsequent analysis. Our “rescaling” method aims to simplify
the patterns in the data as little as possible, aiming instead at
making them interpretable for subsequent analysis. Case votes
are binary, and we aim to give a smooth, ﬂexible and contin-
uous summary of the preferences that generate those votes. To
generate this, we take account of how individuals voted in
similar cases, as well as the varying polarity and cutpoints of
individual cases. The model we present in this article is not the
only way to generate such measures, but it is a particularly
simple way of doing so. Citations are an especially attractive
basis for generating case-speciﬁc preferences because they
closely track the degree to which shared points of law are
raised across cases.
As we note, the estimates of justice preferences at the
individual case level are not particularly precise. Thus the
goal of the exercise is not so much to estimate relative pref-
erences of particular judges in particular cases but instead to
generate measures that can be used in subsequent analysis of
the set of cases as a whole. Our application is to the context
of the Supreme Court, where we have made an argument for
the utility of employing case-speciﬁc preferences in studying
the arguments that have been previously made about the role
of strategic bargaining in the process of generating majority
opinions.
Armed with our estimates of preferences, an analysis of
opinion authoring and joining strengthens past evidenceThis content downloaded from 128.041
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms of the strategic incentives facing the justices. For example,
while scholars have frequently observed the constraining
effect of the norm of equal assignment of opinion-writing
responsibilities across the justices and proposed norm-based
justiﬁcations for this practice, our analysis suggests a norm
of balanced workloads may be supported by the chief jus-
tice’s strategic assignment of opinions to justices who are
closest to him in a given case (cf. Lax and Cameron 2007).
But where one chief justice (Burger) might use this ﬂexibil-
ity to ensure the author is relatively close to his own posi-
tion, another might use this ﬂexibility to ensure the author
is relatively close to the median of the court (Warren). Taken
together, these ﬁndings suggest a complex interaction among
assignment power and bargaining among the justices that
could not be documented as convincingly in the absence of
case-speciﬁc estimates of judicial preferences. While our anal-
ysis is far from the ﬁnal word in the study of Supreme Court
bargaining, we hope that the estimation strategy and empirical
applications reported here will open the door to future em-
pirical investigations of additional theoretical predictions from
the literature.
We conclude by reiterating that while our estimation
approach ﬁts particularly well with the logic of common
law courts, it could also be applied to other contexts including
to legislative voting. The measures of similarity between votes
could be a text-based distance measure between legislative
texts or debates, it could be a network-based function of con-
nections to common underlying statutes, or something else.
One can also estimate dynamic preference models by speci-
fying the strength of connections as a function of chronolog-
ical rather than legal distance. Of course more typical ideal
point estimates remain attractive for many applications. The
approach we present in this article is valuable primarily for
incorporation into subsequent analyses that aim to leverage
variation in preferences across different kinds of votes to as-
sess whether observed legislative processes depend on relative
preferences, or whether existing ideal point estimates proxy
for other constant attributes of individuals.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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